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Perpetual Motion Machines: ESOPS Don’t Pay for Themselves
by Andrew Stumpff
Andrew Stumpff is a lecturer at the
University of Michigan Law School and an
adjunct professor at the University of Alabama
Law School. He would like to thank Sean
Anderson, as well as participants at the January
6 meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools’ Section on Socio-Economics in San
Diego, for comments on the argument
presented in this article.
In this article, Stumpff addresses policy
issues regarding employee stock ownership
plans and demonstrates how some claims in
support of ESOPS aren’t supported by the math.
Summary
An employee stock ownership plan is a
specialized type of employee retirement plan
designed to invest its assets primarily in stock of
the company that sponsors the plan.1 The
paradigmatic “leveraged” ESOP transaction
involves the plan’s drawing a loan from a lender,
using the proceeds to purchase the company’s
stock, and repaying the loan over ensuing years
using contributions made to the plan by the
company, as part of employee compensation. By
these means the retirement plan, which benefits
employees, eventually owns the company that
employs them. Such schemes trace their origin to
outside-the-mainstream economic theories
propounded during the mid-20th century by
Louis Kelso, a lawyer and investment banker.2
Federal law allows ESOPs to exist as qualified
retirement plans3 through exceptions from rules

1

See section 4975(e)(7).

2

See Andrew Stumpff, “Fifty Years of Utopia: A Half-Century After
Louis Kelso’s The Capitalist Manifesto, a Look Back at the Weird History of
the ESOP,” 62 Tax Law. 419 (2009).
3

A qualified pension plan is one that complies with the voluminous,
complicated requirements of section 401(a), thereby qualifying for
favorable tax treatment.
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that would otherwise outlaw them, and it
encourages employers to adopt and maintain
ESOPs by offering tax subsidies. Many
4
commentators, including this author, have
questioned whether it is good policy for the
United States to permit — and actively subsidize
— such a concentration of investment risk in
employer stock in the context of retirement
5
savings. They suggest the better retirement policy
would be to encourage or require plans to
diversify their investments across a broad range of
stocks and other assets, in accordance with
established investment research and theory.
One frequent response by ESOP advocates to
these concerns has been that ESOP-related
investment concentration does not really create
added risk for employees, because the ESOP
compensation that companies provide by means
of the annual contributions used to pay back the
original ESOP loan is additive (extra) to

4

Sean M. Anderson, “Risky Retirement Business: How ESOPs Harm
the Workers They Are Supposed to Help,” 41 Loyola U. Chicago L. J. 1
(2009); Stumpff and Norman Stein, “Repeal Tax Incentives for ESOPs,”
Tax Notes, Oct. 19, 2009, p. 337; William K. Bortz, “The Problem With
ESOPs,” Tax Notes, Apr. 20, 2015, p. 327; John H. Langbein, “Testimony to
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,” Jan. 24, 2002, reprinted as
“What’s Wrong With Employer Stock Pension Plans,” in Enron and Other
Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader 487 (2009); David Millon,
“Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership,” 1 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 113
(2002); Henry Hansmann, “When Does Worker Ownership Work?” 99
Yale L. J. 1749, 1811-1812 (1990); and William R. Levin, “The False
Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee
Stock Ownership Plan,” 95 Yale L. J. 148 (1985).
5

ESOP sponsors have included the bankrupt companies Enron Corp.,
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, United Airlines, WorldCom, and
Chicago Tribune, among others. See also Anderson, supra note 4, at 6-7,
for further examples. Some ESOPs, on the other hand, of course, make
money for their participants. But the point of retirement policy is to
provide broad-based late-life income security, not to follow a high-risk
strategy that consistently produces some groups of retirees who are big
winners and others who face poverty.
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compensation that those companies would
otherwise have paid.6 Under that view, if an ESOP
gains in value, that is all to the good; but if it loses,
the employees will be no worse off than had the
ESOP never existed. More expansively, ESOP
advocates have suggested that an ESOP is an
arrangement whereby the plan “pays for itself”
out of the earnings of the company it has
7
purchased.
This article demonstrates that none of that can
generally be true as a mathematical matter. If the
ESOP seems to be paying for itself, that must
mean either that the company is diverting other
forms of compensation to plan contributions, or
that the ESOP, alone and because of its very
existence, has induced an increase in profitability
relative to the profit that would have obtained if
there had been no ESOP transaction.
That last possibility — another advantage
often claimed for ESOPs by their supporters as a
separate argument for these plans — is highly
controversial and difficult to accept as a reason for
8
an ESOP subsidy. I intend to show that the
argument that “ESOP compensation is extra to
other compensation” is merely a mathematical
restatement of, not an additional argument to, the
questionable proposition that adoption of an
ESOP increases company profitability.
Because my point is straightforward, the
following demonstration will be brief and largely
9
graphical.

6

See Corey Rosen, “Do ESOPs Need Reform? A Look at What the
Data Tell Us,” Tax Notes, June 22, 2015, p. 1465; and Robert Buchele et al.,
“Show Me the Money: Does Shared Capitalism Share the Wealth?” in
Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing,
and Broad-Based Stock Options 362-365 (2010). Usually the evidence
offered is simply that a company also provides some other retirement
plan, or that overall compensation at the company seems high. The
intrinsic logical issues discussed below do not seem to have been
addressed.
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The ESOP Transaction
We begin with a graphical representation of a
company, which for simplicity we shall assume is
10
a C corporation with one class of common stock :

The company’s shareholders own 100 percent
of the company’s economic value in the form of its
shares. The company pays its employees
compensation of various sorts to encourage them
to work and ultimately increase shareholder
value.
Assume the corporation creates an ESOP,
which takes the legal form of a retirement plan
with an associated trust. The trust works like any
other: Company employees are the ESOP trust’s
beneficiaries, and a trustee is appointed who will
take control the trust’s assets and will owe
fiduciary duties to plan participants. Immediately
after its establishment, the ESOP has no assets; it
is a shell, and the participants’ accounts have zero
balances:

7

These words have been used by some of the most prominent ESOP
advocates, including the first, Kelso. James T. O’Hara and R. George
Crawford, “Will Every Corporation Have an E.S.O.P.?: Senator Long
Makes It Hard to Say No,” 61 ABAA L. J. 1366, 1369 (1975). See also Stuart
M. Speiser, “Broadened Capital Ownership — The Solution to Major
Domestic and International Problems,” 7 J. Post Keynesian Econ. 426, 429
(1985).
8

See infra text at notes 16-17, and infra note 19.

9

A similar argument to that made here, presented in much different
terms, has been made by two previous authors but seems to have gone
unaddressed by ESOP advocates. See Robert Hockett, “What Kinds of
Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and
Ownership Societies,” 92 Cornell L. J. 865, Part II.A (2007); David
Ellerman, “Who Pays for ESOP Shares?: ESOP Analysis and Evaluation”
(retrieved Apr. 2018).

1290

10

The economic argument in this article generalizes across all entity
forms. The assumptions here are made only for expositional simplicity.
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Now the ESOP takes out a loan — we assume,
for purposes of this discussion, from a third party
— and purchases from the company’s existing
shareholders all the company’s outstanding
11
stock :

© 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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At this point, immediately after the purchase,
the ESOP’s balance sheet looks like this:
Table 1
ESOP’s Assets

ESOP’s Liabilities

100 percent of the
corporation’s stock, which
has value equal to the
entire fair market value of
the corporation

Debt equal to the purchase
price for 100 percent of the
corporation’s stock, which
is equal to the entire FMV
of the corporation

Assuming the previous shareholders were
12
paid the correct FMV of their stock, the net worth
of the ESOP remains zero: The value of the stock
held by the ESOP is exactly offset by the debt
incurred to acquire it. All the stock held by the
ESOP will, at this initial stage, be pledged as
collateral against the debt incurred to the lender.
How is that debt to be repaid by the ESOP?
The company commences making annual
monetary contributions to the ESOP, which the
company deducts, for tax purposes, as
So now the ESOP has bought the company’s
stock and is its only shareholder:
12

11

Again, these assumptions are not necessary to the ultimate
argument. The loan could be made by the company itself (often from the
proceeds of a “mirror loan” made by a third party to the company); the
ESOP might buy less than all the company’s stock. The validity of the
demonstration here would be unaffected; it is simply easier to convey
the argument with these assumptions.

TAX NOTES, MAY 28, 2018

Assessment of the merits of ESOPs must proceed from the
assumption that the price paid by the plan for company stock is equal, in
general, to the stock’s FMV: neither more nor less. Any other assumption
requires imagining either consistently irrational behavior by the
shareholders (if the price paid is too low) or consistent abuse of the
ESOP (if the price paid is too high). Obviously, specific parties may get a
specific transaction wrong. Lacking a crystal ball, the price to which they
agree will, in the real world, often (always?) after the fact turn out to
have been apparently too low or high. The assertion here is effectively
that in analyzing ESOPs, the price cannot be assumed systematically to
be either too high or too low. Arguments for or against such
arrangements as a matter of general economic policy must stand or fall
on the assumption that the transaction is conducted at FMV.
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compensation expense. Those contributions —
which is what ESOP advocates claim is additional
to other compensation that would otherwise have
been paid to employees by the company had the
ESOP never been created — are used by the ESOP
to pay down the principal and interest on the
acquisition loan:

© 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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ESOP now owns the company. The employees are
collectively, in some sense, their own employer.
This final product forms an interesting sort of selfcontained system, with understandable intuitive
appeal: Employees have become “their own
bosses,” and possess a new opportunity to
participate in whatever wealth creation is
associated with future company growth.
Tracing the Flow of Economic Value

As the loan is paid off, proportional amounts
of the stock are released from collateral and
allocated to participants’ accounts under the plan.
Eventually, the loan is entirely repaid, and all the
company’s stock is allocated to the accounts of,
and thus becomes beneficially owned by, the
company’s employees:

With that background, we can return to the
issue of interest in this article, which is whether
the ESOP has really paid for itself. And the
problem involves the closed-system, recursive
nature of the set of transactions just described.
The company is seen to be using its own earnings
effectively to buy itself, but the money must have
come from somewhere.
Return to Figure 3, describing the transaction
in which the ESOP bought all the company’s
stock. The price for that purchase was ultimately
borne by the company itself, as shown in Figure 5,
out of the company’s ongoing earnings, by means
of ESOP contributions, which repaid the purchase
loan.
But the purchase price was the entire value of
the company itself. We assumed, as noted before,
that the ESOP paid the shareholders exactly the
stock’s FMV (because any contrary state of affairs
cannot be assumed valid as a general
13
proposition). What is the entire FMV of the
company? Simply this: the sum of the company’s
assets, less its debt, plus the present value of all its
14
expected future net income.
To emphasize that point, we reproduce and
annotate Figure 3 by highlighting those places in
which an economic quantity equal to “present
value of the company’s assets and future net
income stream” effectively appears in the
transaction:

13

Supra note 12.

14

The employees are the beneficial owners (as
retirement plan participants) of the ESOP, and the

1292

See generally Jonathan Berk and Peter DeMarzo, “Corporate
Finance” (2014); Aswath Damodaran, “Damodaran on Valuation:
Security Analysis for Investment and Corporate Finance” (2006); and
Florian Steiger, “The Validity of Company Valuation Using Discounted
Cash Flow Methods” (2008).
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The shareholders have received the present
value of the company’s assets and future income
stream in return for their shares. The ESOP has
paid the same quantity, and to be able to do so, has
borrowed from a third party the present value of
the company’s assets and future income stream.
And that amount — the present value of the
company’s assets and future income stream — is
now to be paid back to the third-party lender,
from the company’s future income stream itself,
as shown in Figure 5.
A reader may begin to intuit where this is
heading. All the company’s future net income has
already been taken into account in pricing the
stock bought by the ESOP. Yet we are now, posttransaction, diverting some of that very same
future net income to repayment of the price for
that stock. If the price originally paid was correct,
and all the other post-transaction cash inflows
and outflows are just as they were projected
before the transaction, where is the ESOP
repayment coming from?
At the time of the original transaction, if the
stock was correctly priced, the future net cash
inflow for every future year would have been
fully taken into account in arriving at the FMV to
pay the existing shareholders. Nothing about the
transaction suggests anything would have
changed, after the transaction, regarding that
expected cash flow. The company is thus now
TAX NOTES, MAY 28, 2018
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paying something additional annually, which is
the yearly stream of ESOP contributions used to
pay down the ESOP loan. The obligation to
underwrite this additional negative cash-flow
must be taken into account in evaluating the
company’s new, post-transaction present value. If
everything else has stayed the same — which
nothing so far has given us reason to doubt — and
these contributions simply reduce earnings,
mathematically they should reduce the present
value of earnings to zero, because we are repaying
an amount that totals, by definition, the present
value of all company present and future income,
meaning that the present value of company stock
held by the ESOP is now zero.
Alternatively, if the new ESOP contributions
are actually having no effect on earnings (or less
effect than the full present value of the purchase
price), this effectively means some other cost must
have been reduced.
There is a different, simpler way to see the
overall mathematical problem. Let us zoom out to
account for all value held regarding the entire
system of interest, including the original
shareholders and the ESOP, both before and after
the transaction. Immediately before the
transaction, when the ESOP has initially been
established as simply a shell, the following is the
value within the total shareholder + ESOP system:
Table 2
Value in the System
Shareholders
Pre-transaction

Hold stock =
present value of
company

ESOP
Holds $0 net

Now we examine the leveraged ESOP
transaction detailed above, wherein the ESOP
takes out a loan, buys all the company’s stock, and
then the ESOP repays the loan with company
contributions. After all that is completed, we can
summarize the situation thus:
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Table 3
Value in the System
Shareholders

ESOP

Pre-transaction

Hold stock =
present value of
company

Holds $0 net

Post-transaction

Hold cash =
present value of
company

Holds stock =
post-transaction
present value of
company

The value held by the original shareholders
(the left side of the table) has remained exactly the
same before and after the transaction: those
shareholders have simply changed the form of the
value they own, from stock into cash. The ESOP,
however, now owns all the company’s posttransaction shares. If that holding is worth
anything at all, additional external value must
have come into the shareholders + ESOP system.
From where?
I suggest there are, conceptually, four possible
sources for the missing extra value, if any exists,
that now inheres in the shares. In other words,
there are only four ways the stock held by the
ESOP, post-transaction, can have any economic
value at all:
1. The transaction price was wrong: The
original shareholders actually received too
little from the ESOP for their shares.
2. The fact of the ESOP transaction, by itself,
has increased the company’s value from
what it was before the transaction,
perhaps because employees are now
motivated to work harder, thereby
increasing company efficiency.
3. The company is now expected to reduce
non-ESOP forms of employee
compensation from the level that would
have been expected in the absence of the
transaction.
4. Tax subsidy: The ESOP has paid less than
the company’s FMV at the time of the
transaction, but the selling shareholders
have received, on an after-tax basis, full
market value, the difference being
attributable to the current federal tax
subsidy currently available for sales to
ESOPs.

1294
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Those four possibilities can be assessed briefly
as follows.
First (underpayment of shareholders): It is surely
possible that the original shareholders have been
underpaid by the ESOP for their shares, and thus
the ESOP now enjoys the residual value resulting
from the underpayment. That is, however, an
uninteresting possibility for purposes of the
policy debate about whether ESOPs are generally
beneficial or risk-free arrangements. It cannot be
assumed, systematically, to be the case that ESOPs
always underpay. As noted above, that would
require consistently irrational behavior by the
15
shareholders.
A version of that argument has been made to
this author by ESOP proponents, in the following
form: ESOP shares have post-transaction value
because it is common, in practice, for the original
shareholders to sell for some finite multiple, such
as five, of the company’s expected earnings.
Because the ESOP and company will remain
extant, presumably, for more than five years, the
ESOP will receive the benefit of all income in the
sixth and subsequent years. That response seems
to reflect simply a basic misunderstanding of
“present value.” The further in the future a year’s
earnings are, the more those earnings must be
reduced to obtain their present value. The
multiple of earnings paid for a company can be a
finite integer such as five, not because the outyears are being disregarded by the buyer and
seller, but simply because discounting future
income streams involves reducing future
amounts, in a converging series.
Total Present Value = Σ Present value for
each future year =
Present value of year 0 earnings + present
value of year 1 earnings + present value of
year 2 earnings + . . . .
Because the magnitude of the terms of this
infinite series declines exponentially, the entire
sum may be, and often in practice is,
approximated for valuation purposes by a finite
multiple of the first year’s earnings. That is, the
infinite sum above may be approximated by
something like five times year 1 earnings. That

15

See supra note 12.
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does not mean any post-year 5 earnings are being
“disregarded” or left unaccounted for in the
valuation.
Second (increased productivity owing simply to
the fact of the ESOP itself): As noted in the
introduction, ESOP proponents argue —
mistakenly couching this argument as in addition
to the argument that ESOP compensation is extra
compensation, rather than as merely a logical
restatement of that argument — that employees of
ESOP companies are more productive and
effective than employees of other companies.
Presumably, this would mean, having now done
an ESOP transaction, the company in our example
would be worth more immediately thereafter for
the sheer reason that the ESOP now exists.
The idea that ESOPs promote productivity is
highly contested as an empirical matter.16 But even
if the claim of increased productivity were true, it
could not justify government subsidies, whether
in the form of tax advantages or otherwise. If
ESOPs convey a competitive advantage, one
would suppose rational business managers
would hasten to adopt them in the absence of any
subsidy. Indeed, under the assumption that over
the long run markets behave Darwinistically, that
ESOPs have not by now been universally (or even
commonly)17 adopted by U.S. companies —
despite decades not merely of availability but of
active federal subsidy — should be conclusive
evidence that those arrangements do not confer
the claimed competitive economic advantage.
Third (reduction in other compensation): If the
new value in the company’s shares arises, even in
part, because the company has redirected other
forms of compensation to ESOP contributions,
that is just what we do not want from public
retirement policy. In this case we will have
required of the employees a forced investment, in
effect, of part of their compensation in the
undiversified stock of their employer. Empirical

16

See sources cited at Anderson, supra note 4, at 25-26, nn.107-118.

17

According to the National Center for Employee Ownership, which
advocates for ESOPs, on the order of 6,000 companies maintain such
plans (and the number in which the ESOP is a majority owner of the
company would certainly be smaller). National Center for Employee
Ownership, “ESOPs by the Numbers” (Mar. 2018). The total number of
businesses in the United States with at least one employee, meanwhile, is
estimated to be at least 18 million. U.S. Small Business Administration,
“Frequently Asked Questions.” That suggests ESOP companies
represent roughly 1/13th of 1 percent of U.S. employers.
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evidence exists that this is often an expected
source of any value from implementing an ESOP.18
Fourth (tax subsidy): Some dimension of
income tax arbitrage (together in some
combination with the compensation diversion
just discussed) does account for whatever value is
created by ESOP transactions in practice, in this
author’s experience. The ESOP does often pay less
than the full value of the shares, and the selling
shareholders are willing to accept this lesser
amount, because the shareholders receive a large
tax subsidy: Section 1042 defers recognition of
gain on the sold shares provided only that the
shareholders reinvest the proceeds in some
combination of other stock, which can be fully
diversified.
But again, this is an uninteresting rationale if
the question of interest is whether, as a policy
matter, the United States should permit or
subsidize ESOPs in the first place. ESOPs are
currently tax-subsidized, so it is no surprise that
the value of that subsidy may find itself reflected
in ESOP transactions. To the extent ESOP
transactions can currently be explained by this
subsidy, the ESOPs can be thought of as involving
a transfer of value from U.S. taxpayers,
collectively, to employees and selling
shareholders in ESOP transactions.19 If we are
going to effect transfers of value from taxpayers to
employees for retirement purposes, it seems
better that the resulting value be diversified,
rather than concentrated in a single stock.
Ultimately, the pro-ESOP argument that the
plan pays for itself logically boils down to this:
Adoption of the ESOP itself must have increased
company value. Otherwise the transaction would
have to have, from nowhere, produced new value,
cost-free to all the actors. The economic idea that

18

See Anderson and Stumpff, “Proposal for a Non-Subsidized, NonRetirement-Plan, Employee-Owned Investment Vehicle to Replace the
ESOP,” University of Michigan Law and Economic Research Paper, at
9-10, n.25 (2018).
19

As noted earlier, if the idea is that ESOPs increase productivity, that
is precisely a reason not to subsidize it. The market will take care of
things, if the assertion is true, without the government stepping in to
pick winners and losers. (And the situation is, contrary to a
counterargument sometimes heard from ESOP advocates, completely
unlike that of products such as solar panels, which the government
might choose to subsidize to encourage development of the
manufacturing scale necessary to make them economically competitive.
No minimum scale of market uptake would be required to realize
immediately the competitive benefit of ESOP ownership, if any exists.)
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resources of the company itself can be used to pay
the full FMV of that company, while leaving value
behind and without some external change such as
increased productivity or diverted compensation,
is equivalent to the physical idea of a perpetual
20
motion machine.

© 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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business world. Why not, if they provide
employees and shareholders something for
nothing?



Conclusion
I have previously written about Louis Kelso,
mentioned above, who first conceived of ESOPs.21
Kelso’s ideas sprang from the political and
economic milieu of the mid-20th century, and the
then-pitched global ideological battle underway
between Marxism and capitalism as principles of
economic organization. Kelso despised the
inequality and concentrations of wealth on
display in Western economies, but he also
urgently wished to avoid reliance on the socialistinflected idea of “redistribution of wealth” to
remedy the problem. ESOPs (among other ideas)
were meant as a way to lift and protect working
people from poverty without having to interfere
too directly with the basic workings of capitalism.
But Kelso’s and his followers’ justifications for
ESOPs, however superficially attractive, involve
mostly smoke and mirrors. There is no magic way
(or, at least, ESOPs are not a way) to avoid having
to redistribute income to combat inequality.
Perhaps it would be better simply to accept that
the best approach is to try to strike an appropriate
balance — maybe along the lines of that
associated today with Nordic countries —
between basic free enterprise and redistribution,
including a meaningful, thoughtfully constructed
safety net and a strong, inclusive education
system.
Those are of course big questions. But we can
at the very least say this: The idea that ESOPs pay
for themselves — that they provide additional
employee value at no theoretical cost to anyone
else, including the employees — is fully rebutted.
If the demonstration above does not persuade a
reader of that, experience should. Despite many
decades of active and significant tax subsidy,
ESOPs remain rare and have not taken over the
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See David Grossman, “A Short History of Perpetual Motion
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